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INTRODUCTION
The 1991 trademark decisions of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit treated a variety of procedural and sub-
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stantive issues. Of the sixteen cases discussed in this Article, one
was a direct appeal from the Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks, thirteen were appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board, and two were appeals from federal district courts.'
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
A number of the most significant Federal Circuit decisions in
1991 dealt with procedural issues: compliance with section 8 of the
Lanham Act, dismissal for failure to prosecute under Trademark
Rule 2.132(a), tacking, fraudulent misuse of the registration symbol,
and disclaimers under section 6 of the Lanham Act.
A. Compliance with Section 8
The purpose of section 8 of the Lanham Act is to remove unused
marks, or "deadwood," from the register. 2 Under section 8, trade-
mark registrations are subject to automatic cancellation by the Com-
missioner if a proper affidavit or declaration of continued use is not
filed prior to the end of the sixth year after the date of registration. 3
In In re Mother Tucker's Food Experience, Inc.,4 the petitioner ap-
pealed the decision of the Commissioner to cancel three of its regis-
trations for failure to file declarations properly alleging "use in
commerce" of its marks.5 The declarations filed by petitioner each
1. This Article only reviews those decisions of the Federal Circuit which offer substan-
tive discussion of trademark law. Omitted are per curiam judgments of affirmance without
opinion rendered pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 36. See General Mills, Inc. v. Lifesource of
N.Y., Inc., 925 F.2d 1480, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1736 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Entenmann's Inc., 928
F.2d 411 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Institut Merieux S.A. v. Disease Detection Int'l, Inc., 935 F.2d 279
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Interface Group, Inc. v. Cinetex, S.A., 935 F.2d 279 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re
Multiform Desiccants, 935 F.2d 280 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Teledynamics, Inc. v. Teledyne, Inc.,
940 F.2d 676 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Libertyville Saddle Shop, Inc. v. E.Jeffries & Sons, Ltd., 949
F.2d 404 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Baychem Int'l, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 951 F.2d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Also omitted are decisions in which substantive discussion of trademark law is de minimis.
See In re Stanbel, Inc., 925 F.2d 1480, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Mirafi Inc. v.
Murphy, 928 F.2d 410, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Sun Prods. Group, Inc. v. B & E
Sales Co., 935 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Resolve Through Sharing, Inc. v. Resolve, Inc., 940
F.2d 676 (Fed. Cir. 1991); National Presto Indus., Inc. v. Dazey Corp., 949 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir.
1991);Johannsen v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 950 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
2. The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Recoin-
mendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 407-09 (1987); S.
REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5578, 5582-83.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (1988).
4. 925 F.2d 1402, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1975 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
5. In re Mother Tucker's Food Experience, Inc., 925 F.2d 1402, 1402-03, 17 U.S.P.Q2d
1795, 1795-96 (Fed. Cir. 1991). To reach its conclusion, the court applied the pre-1988 pro-
visions of section 8(a), which were in force at the time Mother Tucker's filed its declarations of
use. Id. at 1405 n.4, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1798 n.4. The pre-1988 statute provided:
Each certificate of registration shall remain in force for 20 years: Provided, That the
registration of any mark under the provisions of this chapter shall be canceled by the
Commissioner at the end of six years following its date, unless within one year next
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stated that the respective marks at issue were "still in use" in con-
nection with restaurant services and each was accompanied by sup-
porting specimens showing the mark as currently used. 6
Additionally, each declaration stated that "no other person... has
the right to use said mark in commerce."' 7
After the Examiner refused to accept the declarations, Mother
Tucker petitioned the Commissioner for permission to submit cor-
rected declarations, explaining that the omission of the words "in
commerce" was inadvertent.8 The Commissioner denied the peti-
tion. 9 Mother Tucker argued on appeal to the Federal Circuit that
the omission was merely technical because the marks were actually
in use in commerce and the declarations were timely filed. 10
The court indicated a willingness to overlook a "mere technical
defect" in section 8 compliance. It cited the decision of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals in Morehouse Manufacturing Corp. v. J.
Strickland & Co.,"' which held that a registrant's mark is properly
continued on the register where the section 8 affidavit is filed with a
specimen mark slightly different from the form of the registered
mark in use at the time of filing.1 2 In recognizing that practically all
of the user's substantive trademark rights are derived from continu-
ing use of the trademark, the court in Morehouse determined that no
public good can be gained by cancelling a technically valid trade-
preceding the expiration of such six years the registrant shall file in the Patent and
Trademark Office an affidavit showing that said mark is in use in commerce or show-
ing that its nonuse is due to special circumstances which excuse such nonuse and is
not due to any intention to abandon the mark. Special notice of the requirement for
such affidavit shall be attached to each certificate of registration.
The Principal Register, ch. 540, tit. I, § 8, 60 Stat. 431 (1946) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1058(a) (1988)). By contrast, the current section 8(a) reads as follows:
Each certificate of registration shall remain in force for ten years: Provided, That
the registration of any mark under the provisions of this chapter shall be canceled by
the Commissioner at the end of six years following its date, unless within one year
next preceding the expiration of such six years the registrant shall file in the Patent
and Trademark Office an affidavit setting forth those goods or services recited in the
registration on or in connection with which the mark is in use in commerce and
attaching to the affidavit a specimen or facsimile showing current use of the mark, or
showing that any nonuse is due to special circumstances which excuse such nonuse
and is not due to any intention to abandon the mark. Special notice of the require-
ment for such affidavit shall be attached to each certificate or registration.
15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (1988).




10. Id. at 1404, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1797. Appeal was made pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 1071 (a) (1988), which allows direct appeal of the Commissioner's ruling to the Federal Cir-
cuit in section 8 proceedings.
11. 407 F.2d 881, 160 U.S.P.Q. 715 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
12. Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v.J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 887-88, 160 U.S.P.Q.
715, 720 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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mark registration because of an affidavit containing a minor techni-
cal defect.'1
The court in Mother Tucker's found that when the defect goes to a
"mandatory" statutory provision, however, the Commissioner has
far less flexibility in overlooking noncompliance.' 4 Thus, the deci-
sion in Mother Tucker's turned on whether the failure to allege "use
in commerce" violated a mandatory requirement of the Lanham
Act. 15
This is not a point on which existing case law provided much use-
ful guidance. In a number of unpublished decisions, the Patent and
Trademark Office had permitted registrants to submit corrected sec-
tion 8 declarations after the expiration of the sixth year where the
original submission properly alleged "use in commerce" but failed
to specify the nature of that use. 1
6
However, in In re PSI Mobile Products, Inc.,17 the PTO held the
omission of the words "use in commerce" from the affidavit or dec-
laration to be fatal. In PSI, the Assistant Commissioner for Trade-
marks acknowledged that during a significant portion of 1987, PTO
practice permitted registrants to amend affidavits to indicate that
their mark was in use in commerce, despite the fact that the filing
period had expired.' 8 He noted, however, that the PTO changed
this practice in order to conform to the statutory requirement.' 9
The Assistant Commissioner found that the Affidavit-Renewal Ex-
13. Id at 888, 160 U.S.P.Q. at 720. In exercising discretion, the Commissioner has on
occasion invoked 35 U.S.C. § 26, which states:
Any document to be filed in the Patent and Trademark Office and which is required
by any law, rule, or other regulation to be executed in a specified manner may be
provisionally accepted by the Commissioner despite a defective execution, provided
a properly executed document is submitted within such time as may be prescribed.
35 U.S.C. § 26 (1988). This statute is implemented through Trademark Rule 2.146(a)(3),
which states, "Petitions may be taken to the Commissioner ... to invoke the supervisory
authority of the Commissioner in appropriate circumstances." 37 C.F.R. § 2.146(a)(3)
(1991). See In re Weider, 212 U.S.P.Q. 947, 948 (Comm'r 1981) ("Application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 26 is discretionary with the Commissioner."); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:45, at 989-90 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 26 to defective section 8 affidavits).
14. Mother Tucker's, 925 F.2d at 1404 n.3, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1797 n.3. The court cited
THEODORE SEDGEWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 316-18 (2d ed. 1874) in support of
the distinction between "mandatory" and "discretionary" statutory provisions. Id.
15. A statement of "use in commerce" is also specifically required by Trademark Rule
2.162, which states that "[t]he affidavit or declaration ... must... (e) State that the registered
mark is in use in commerce .. " Id.
16. See In re Glyco Chems., Inc., PTO No. 88-33 (Asst. Comm'r Sept. 9, 1988); In re
American Ass'n of Ins. Management Consultants, PTO No. 88-2 (Asst. Comm'r May 24,
1988).
17. PTO No. 88-100 (Asst. Comm'r Apr. 21, 1989).
18. In re PSI Mobile Prods., Inc., PTO No. 88-100 (Asst. Comm'r Apr. 21, 1989).
19 Id.
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aminer properly refused to accept the deficient affidavit.20
This decision was echoed in subsequent holdings. 21 Eight
months after PSI, however, the Assistant Commissioner reversed
the decision of an Examiner cancelling a mark for failure to file an
affidavit properly alleging "use in commerce" within the statutory
period. In In re.T. Baker, Inc.,22 the Assistant Commissioner rea-
soned that the mark's use was obvious from petitioner's statement
that the mark was "still in use in the United States ... and for sale
through a network of distributors and on a direct basis with custom-
ers."' 23 The Assistant Commissioner cited Morehouse as his primary
source of authority and made no mention of PS1.24
Bringing apparent confusion to an end, the Federal Circuit in
Mother Tucker's reviewed the legislative history and declared that the
failure to specifically allege or make an alternative showing of "use
in commerce" is not a minor technical defect which may be cured by
the benevolent exercise of administrative discretion. 25 The court




21. See, e.g., In re Chicago S. Shore & S. Bend R.R., PTO No. 88-113 (Asst. Comm'r Apr.
25, 1989).
22. PTIO No. 89-37 (Asst. Comm'r Dec. 21, 1989).
23. In reJ.T. Baker, Inc., PTO No. 89-37 (Asst. Comm'r Dec. 21, 1989)J.T. Baker may be
distinguished from PSI in that the petitioner in. T. Baker submitted a specimen showing use
of the mark in commerce.
24. Id (citing Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v.J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 160 U.S.P.Q.
715 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
25. Mother Tucker's, 925 F.2d at 1405, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1798. As stated by the court:
Although the text of Section 8 required a "showing" of use in commerce, and did not
state that Section 8 affidavits must aver "use in commerce" in haec verba, in Mother
Tucker's case there was neither averral nor alternative showing.... This was not a
minor technical defect. It was not within the Commissioner's discretionary authority
to waive this requirement, and thus the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in
holding that this omission could not be cured after the end of the statutory sixth
year.
Mother Tucker's, 925 F.2d at 1405, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1798.
26. L The court stated:
The words "in commerce" were added to Section 8 in 1982, when the phrase "still in
use" was changed to "in use in commerce." While the purpose of the statutory
change was to assure that foreign or intrastate commerce not be included as "in use"
under Section 8, this legislative action underlines the central importance of use in
commerce that is subject to the Lanham Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
The court also noted that, after the events at issue, section 8 was amended to impose even
stricter requirements. l The 1988 amendments replaced the words "showing that said mark
is in use in commerce" with "setting forth those goods or services recited in the registration
on or in connection with which the mark is in use in commerce and attaching to the affidavit a
specimen or facsimile showing current use of the mark .... "d. at 1405 n.4, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1798 n.4.
Under the amended section 8, supra note 5, the Commissioner has held that a section 8
affidavit or declaration is fatally defective if it fails to state the goods or services in connection
with which the mark is registered or used in commerce. See In re Bonbons Barnier S.A., 17
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Mother Tucker argued that its averral of "use ... in connection
with restaurant services" was a sufficient alternate statutory show-
ing. The court, however, agreed with the Commissioner that this
statement, while explaining the type of use of the marks, failed to
present an averral of "use in commerce" because it was not clear
whether services were offered to interstate travellers. 27 The court
also rejected Mother Tucker's argument that its specimens, includ-
ing a dinner menu, a display card used to advertise beverages, and
an advertisement concerning group events, were sufficient to fill the
gap in the declaration, because they did not on their face disclose
"use in commerce." 28 Finally, the court rejected Mother Tucker's
argument that because of its Canadian incorporation and registra-
tion pursuant to section 44(e) of the Lanham Act, the Commissioner
required a more rigorous showing under section 8 than is imposed
on domestic registrants. 29
B. Dismissal for Failure To Prosecute
The result reached in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp. 3o should
serve to warn practitioners before the Board that failure to follow
the procedural requirements of the Trademark Rules of Practice can
have dire consequences and that professional courtesy can end with-
out warning. During the pendency of this opposition proceeding, a
total of seven stipulated extensions of time were agreed to by the
U.S.P.Q.2d 1488, 1489-90 (Asst. Comm'r 1990); In re Texaco, Inc., PTO No. 91-11 (Asst.
Comm'rJuly 12, 1991). The declaration or affidavit may incorporate by reference the state-
ment of goods contained in the certificate of registration. See Bonbons Barnier, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1489. Moreover, the declaration or affidavit is not fatally defective if it states that the mark
is in continuous use in interstate commerce in connection with the goods or services in a
given international class. See In re Ash, PTO No. 91-21 (Asst. Comm'r Sept. 13, 1991); In re
Financial News Network, PTO No. 91-10 (Asst. Comm'r Sept. 13, 1991). However, it may not
state that the mark is used in commerce as shown by an attached specimen. Id.; In re Texaco,
slip op. at 2.
27. Mother Tucker's, 925 F.2d at 1406, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1798. Implicit in this part of
Judge Newman's opinion is the notion that intrastate establishments which serve a purely
intrastate clientele would not be able to secure federal registration of their marks. In a subse-
quent opinion discussed later in this Article, Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Restau-
rant Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1292 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 85 (1991), the
Federal Circuit left in doubt whether any use in commerce was so purely intrastate as to merit
denial of federal registration. Judge Newman dissented from this opinion.
28. Mother Tucker's, 925 F.2d at 1406, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1798. With regard to an "alterna-
tive showing" of "use in commerce," the court noted the Commissioner's statement that the
declaration would have been accepted had the specimens actually shown use in commerce.
29. Id. at 1406-07, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1799. Section 44(e) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1126(e) (1988), provides for registration of foreign marks by virtue of a foreign registration
without a showing of use in commerce. Id. The Trademark Revision Act of 1988 added tile
following language to this section: "The application must state the applicant's bona fide in-
tention to use the mark in commerce, but use in commerce shall not be required prior to
registration."
30. 931 F.2d 1551, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1710 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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parties and approved by the Board.3 1 Two weeks before the close of
opposer's testimony pursuant to the last extension, opposer sent a
letter to the applicant rejecting a settlement offer. With the letter,
opposer enclosed a proposed stipulation for a further extension of
time and requested that applicant sign the stipulation and forward it
to the Board.3 2 Opposer did not follow up on the matter and appli-
cant did not reply until some eight weeks after the close of op-
poser's testimony period, when it informed opposer that it would
agree to no further extensions. Opposer then moved to extend the
testimony period,3 3 and applicant filed a cross-motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.132(a)34 At the
time these motions were filed, opposer had made no evidence of
record.
The Federal Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discre-
tion by granting applicant's motion on the ground that opposer's
failure to move for an extension before the close of its testimony
period constituted neither "excusable neglect" 35 under Rule 6(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor "good and sufficient
cause" for delay under Trademark Rule 2.132(a).3 6 The Court
found that it was Hewlett-Packard's responsibility as opposer to
timely request from the Board an extension of its testimony period
31. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp., 931 F.2d 1551, 1552, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1710,
1711 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
32. Id. It seems to be of some consequence that opposer, in seeking the extension in
writing, deviated from the parties' established practice of agreeing to extensions by phone
and filing a "Stipulated Extension" with a confirming copy to the opposing counsel. Id.
33. Id. The Board treated opposer's motion as one to reopen prosecution pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Id.
34. Id. Trademark Rule 2.132(a) provides:
If the time for taking testimony by any party in the position of plaintiff has expired
and that party has not taken testimony or offered any other evidence, any party in the
position of defendant may, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event
the motion is denied, move for dismissal on the ground of the failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute. The party in the position of plaintiff shall have fifteen days from the
date of service of the motion to show cause why judgment should not be rendered
against him. In the absence of a showing of good and sufficient cause, judgment may
be rendered against the party in the position of plaintiff. If the motion is denied,
testimony periods will be reset for the party in the position of defendant and for
rebuttal.
37 C.F.R. § 2.132(a) (1991).
35. The Board defines "excusable neglect" as:
failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's
own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in
consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance
on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 931 F.2d at 1552-53, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1712. Apparently opposer did not
argue that it should not be penalized by dismissal of the proceeding because it had relied on
the "care and vigilance" of its counsel.
36. Id.
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if one was needed.3 7
Hewlett-Packard simply relied on the assumption that Olympus
would execute and forward a stipulated extension to the Board.
The court determined that a request for an extension to one's oppo-
nent does not, by itself, meet the burden required for an enlarge-
ment of the testimony period.38 Nor was Hewlett-Packard
permitted to rely on Olympus' inaction to establish that its own ne-
glect was excusable. Furthermore, Hewlett-Packard's counsel knew
or should have been aware of the fact that the PTO had not re-
turned a copy of an approved stipulated extension to his office, as
required by Trademark Rule 2.121(d).39 The court's ruling in this
case was not surprising given the plain language of Trademark Rule
2.132(a).
Hewlett-Packard received a further education regarding the
Trademark Rules of Practice when it argued that, despite its failure
to take testimony, it had established a prima facie case by attaching
copies (not status copies) of its pleaded registrations to the Notice
of Opposition. The court pointed out that this makeshift argument
failed to recognize that there are only three specific ways to establish
a prima facie case by introduction of registrations into evidence: (1)
by the opposer or petitioner submitting two copies of the registra-
tion prepared and issued by the PTO, showing both the current title
to the registration and the status of the registration; (2) by the party
giving appropriate identification and introduction of the registration
at the taking of testimony; or (3) by filing a notice of reliance on the
registrations at the time of opposer's testimony. 40 In upholding the
Board's dismissal of the proceeding with prejudice, the court
pointed out that "these rules are simple and clear" and that opposer
failed to follow them.41 It is also clear that the penalty imposed for
failure to follow the rules can be painful.42
37. Id
38. Id
39. Id at 1553, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1712. The court dismissed as "border[ing] on the friv-
olous" opposer's argument that applicant's counsel's failure to sign and forward the re-
quested stipulation violated "ethical standards" or "commercial morality." Id.
40. Id at 1554, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1713 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d) (1991)). This notice
of reliance shall include a copy of the registration prepared and issued by the PTO.
41. Id.
42. Opposer's argument that applicant admitted the validity of opposer's pleaded regis-
trations in its answer received equally short shrift. Applicant only admitted the registrations
had issued to opposer, but denied they were "valid and subsisting," or "in full force and
effect." Id. at 1553-54, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1712-13. Compare Tiffany & Co. v. Columbia Indus.,
Inc., 455 F.2d 582, 585, 173 U.S.P.Q. 6, 8 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (stating that admissions by op-
poser regarding registration established prima facie case of ownership).
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C. Tacking
Occasionally, in cases before the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board, parties will attempt to save themselves by establishing an
earlier date of first use based on evidence of use with respect to an
acquired mark that is not identical to the mark at issue, but is al-
leged to be its "legal equivalent." This practice is called "tack-
ing."43 In Van Dyne-Crotty Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp.,44 the Federal
Circuit reiterated that this practice only will be condoned in "rare
instances." 4
5
In Van Dyne-Crotty, the cancellation petitioner alleged that regis-
trant's mark, CLOTHES THAT WORK, was likely to be confused
with petitioner's three marks, CLOTHING THAT WORKS,
CLOTHES THAT WORK HARD, and CLOTHES THAT WORK
OVERTIME. While registrant claimed rights back to 1985, peti-
tioner demonstrated use as early as 1983.46 After the petition was
filed, in order to save its registration, the registrant purchased the
rights of a third party in the mark "CLOTHES THAT WORK. FOR
THE WORK YOU DO. ' 47 The use of this mark extended back to
the 1970s. Nevertheless, the Board granted the petition to cancel,
refusing to "tack" the third-party date of first use onto registrant's
mark. The Board's decision was based on a finding that the marks
CLOTHES THAT WORK and "CLOTHES THAT WORK. FOR
THE WORK YOU DO" were not confusingly similar and therefore
not legal equivalents for tacking purposes.48
43. For a general discussion of "tacking," see 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRACTICE § 3.03[2][g], at 3-71 to 3-72 (1991).
44. 926 F.2d 1156, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1866 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
45. Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1160, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
1866, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing I JEROME GiLSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE
§ 3.03, at 3-48 (1983)).
46. Id. at 1158, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1867. By the time the proceeding arrived at the Federal
Circuit, the issue of likelihood of confusion was not in dispute. I& at 1158-59, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1868. Only the validity of registrant's attempted tacking was in dispute. Id.
47. Id. at 1158, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1867. Van Dyne-Crotty purchased the mark
"CLOTHES THAT WORK. FOR THE WORK YOU DO" from Horace Small Manufacturing
Co., which produced clothes similar to those of Van Dyne-Crotty and Wear-Guard. Id. Hor-
ace Small targeted these clothes to the wholesale market, however, which was substantially
different than the retail market where Van Dyne-Crotty and Wear-Guard marketed their prod-
ucts. Id One of the pertinent questions was whether or not the purchase represented a valid
assignment or was merely an assignment in gross. Petitioner argued that the purchase of the
third-party mark was "a 'naked assignment,' amounting to little more than a sham .... Id. at
1159, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1868. The majority did not reach this issue, although the concurring
opinion of Judge Newman appears to be based in part on the assumption that registrant's
acquisition of rights was an assignment in gross. Id at 1160-61, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1869. In
this regard, the Board and the court may have been subjectively influenced by the fact that the
purchased mark was used in connection with the wholesale market while the parties' other
marks were used in the retail market. Id. at 1158, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1867.
48. Id. at 1160, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1869.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that for the pur-
pose of determining whether the date of first use of one mark may
be tacked onto that of another, the standard for measuring legal
equivalence is higher than that used for evaluating competing marks
with regard to likelihood of confusion. To meet the "legal equiva-
lence" standard for tacking, the marks must be indistinguishable
and the consumer should consider the two marks as one and the
same.49 Importantly, the court went on to hold that marks are not
necessarily legal equivalents for tacking purposes simply because
they are confusingly similar.50 It also held that it would be improper
to "sanction the tacking of a mark with a narrow commercial impres-
sion onto one with a broader commercial impression." 51
In reviewing the marks for legal equivalence, the court noted that
the Board need not entertain any evidence other than the visual and
aural appearance of the marks themselves.5 2 The court held that,
because the marks in their entirety clearly "create different commer-
cial impressions," tacking would be improper.
55
D. Fraudulent Misuse of Registration Symbol
Pursuant to section 29 of the Lanham Act, only owners of marks
registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office may
display the registration symbol ® in conjunction with a mark.54 De-
pending on the circumstances, use of the registration symbol in con-
junction with an unregistered mark may bar future registration or
operate as an equitable defense to an infringement suit.55 Tradi-
49. Id. at 1159, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1868.
50. Id. The court states that there are two levels of "legal equivalence" at work in this
type of proceeding. The Board first held that the petitioner's marks CLOTHING THAT
WORKS, CLOTHING THAT WORKS HARD, and CLOTHES THAT WORK OVERTIME
were the legal equivalent of registrant's mark CLOTHES THAT WORK and thus confusingly
similar. It then held that "CLOTHES THAT WORK. FOR THE WORK YOU DO" was not
confusingly similar to CLOTHES THAT WORK and thus not its legal equivalent for the pur-
pose of tacking. Id Judge Newman's conclusion that the latter two marks are confusingly
similar seems more reasonable.
51. Id. at 1160, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1869.
52. Id at 1159, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1868.
53. Id. at 1160, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1868-69. Reaching conclusions that seem slightly in-
consistent, the court distinguished Laura Scudder's v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 136
U.S.P.Q. 418, 419-20 (T.T.A.B. 1962), in which the Board held BLUE BIRD to be the legal
equivalent of BLUE ROBIN, because even though the marks differed slightly in definition,
both connoted the same general meaning in context. Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1160, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1869.
54. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1988).
55. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:53, at 1004
(2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1991) (citing cases illustrating circumstances which may or may not bar
future registration). See, e.g., Four Roses Prods. Co. v. Small Grain Distilling & Drug Co., 29
F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (finding misuse of registration notice sufficient to bar registration);
Gear Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 508, 518, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1192, 1198
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (concluding that misuse of notice on mark not registered for particular goods
960
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tionally, however, the Board has been extremely lenient in accepting
excuses for such misuse. In one decision, the Board held that an
applicant's improper use of the registration symbol will defeat its
registration right only in those cases where it can be conclusively
established that the party intended to cause the purchasing public or
others in the trade to believe falsely that the mark was registered.5 6
The recent Federal Circuit decision, Copelands' Enterprises, Inc. v.
CNV, Inc. ,57 may signal a slightly less forgiving attitude toward par-
ties who intentionally or negligently misuse the statutory registra-
tion notice.
Copelands', a sporting goods retailer, sold VUARNET brand sun-
glasses manufactured by Pouilloux, a French concern.58 Until 1982,
Copelands' obtained its VUARNET sunglasses primarily from CNV,
a distributor. In late 1982, CNV ceased supplying Copelands' with
VUARNET sunglasses and Copelands' found other suppliers. CNV
sent Copelands' a cease and desist letter in early 1983, claiming the
VUARNET mark was registered in the United States, CNV was the
exclusive owner of the mark in the United States, and Copelands'
goods were "gray market" goods which infringed CNV's trademark
rights. 59
In response, Copelands' attorney informed CNV that the
VUARNET mark was not registered in the United States, but was
merely the subject of a pending application filed in the name of the
French manufacturer, Pouilloux. Copelands' also supplied CNV
with evidence of misuse of the registration symbol not only in con-
nection with the mark VUARNET, but with the mark VUARNET
FRANCE as well. Copelands' specifically warned that this use was a
"fraudulent misuse of the mark" that would support a refusal to reg-
ister and subject a subsequently registered mark to cancellation.
Copelands' then demanded that CNV cease and desist from using
the registration symbol in connection with the unregistered marks.
CNV did not respond to the demand, but continued its practice of
is, in conjunction with other evidence and balancing equities, reason for finding unclean
hands); Fox-Stanley Photo Prods., Inc. v. Otaguro, 339 F. Supp. 1293, 174 U.S.P.Q. 257 (D.
Mass. 1972) (determining misuse of notice constitutes unclean hands and bars infringement
suit). But cf Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 226 U.S.P.Q. 914, 915-16 n.14
(T.T.A.B. 1985) (stating that misuse ofnotice caused by misunderstanding and no demonstra-
tion of deceptive intent created no justification for refusal of registration); Nupro v. Nypro,
Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 693, 696 (D. Mass. 1983) (holding that premature use one of notice month
before registration issued does not constitute unclean hands).
56. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Concorde Battery Corp., 228 U.S.P.Q. 39, 44 (T.T.A.B.
1985).
57. 945 F.2d 1563, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
58. Copelands' Enters., Inc. v. CNV, Inc., 945 F.2d 1563, 1564, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1295,
1296 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
59. Id. at 1564-65 n.1, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1296-97 n.l.
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misusing the registration symbol.60
Subsequently, the French manufacturer's application to register
VUARNET matured into a registration that was assigned to CNV.
CNV also applied for registration of the mark VUARNET FRANCE,
in connection with which it had also misused the registration sym-
bol. Copelands' petitioned to cancel the VUARNET registration and
filed an opposition with respect to CNV's VUARNET FRANCE ap-
plication. Both proceedings were based on the prior misuse of the
registration symbol.
The Board granted CNV's motion for summary judgment with re-
spect to both proceedings.6 ' It held that the declarations filed by
CNV established, as a matter of law, a lack of intent to deceive on
CNV's part, and therefore precluded the cancellation or denial of
registration. 62 The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that "the fac-
tual question of intent is particularly unsuited to disposition on
summary judgment." 63 The court also noted that CNV "aggres-
sively misrepresented the status of the VUARNET mark, an action
consistent with intent to mislead or deceive." 4 The court con-
cluded that CNV did not make a good faith effort to seek legal ad-
vice with respect to misuse of the registration notice after receiving
specific warning from Copelands'. 65 Thus, CNV's assertions of in-
nocent intent were considered conclusory and suspect. The court
remanded the case to the Board for trial.66
60. Id. at 1564, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1297.
61. Id. at 1565, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1297.
62. Id. at 1566-67, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1298-99. CNV had a variety of excuses for its mis-
use. Its chairman thought the mark was registered by Pouilloux until he received Copelands'
letter. The chairman then relied on assurances by the French company that the symbol could
be used in connection with marks registered in France. Id. Additionally, a French attorney
stated that the symbol is commonly used in France even though it has no legal significance.
Finally, CNV's U.S. counsel claimed to have sent the cease and desist letter to Copelands'
while simply relying on the assumption that Pouilloux had a federal registration.
63. Id. at 1567, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1299.
"The movant bears the burden of demonstrating absence of all genuine issues of
material fact." . . . A nonmovant, on the other hand, "must do more than merely
raise some doubt as to the existence of a fact; evidence must be forthcoming from
the nonmovant which would be sufficient to require submission to the jury of the
dispute over the fact." However, the evidence must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the nonmovant and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in its favor.
The nonmoving party "need only present evidence from which ajury might return a
verdict in [its] favor."
Id. at 1565-66, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1297-98 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 1567, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1299.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1568, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1300. This proceeding is another example of the care
counsel must take in representing client interests. Noting the fact that CNV's counsel appar.
ently did not warn CNV of the consequences of the misuse of the registration symbol, the
court stated that this lack of diligence could constitute "gross negligence and reckless disre.
gard of the law." Id. at 1568 n.6, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1299-1300 n.6.
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E. Section 6 Disclaimers
The Supreme Court approved the policy of allowing trademark
registration applicants to disclaim unregistrable portions of com-
posite marks as early as 1920 in the case of Estate of P.D. Beckwith,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents.67 Section 6 of the Lanham Act, enacted
in 1946, represented a codification of then-existing Patent Office
policy regarding disclaimers. 68 Disclaimer policy continued to
evolve, and in 1962 Congress amended section 6 in what it de-
scribed as a "housekeeping" bill, intended to clarify and codify ex-
isting practices.6 9  The primary effect of the amendment was to
allow, rather than require, the Commissioner to request disclaimers
and to allow voluntary disclaimers by an applicant.
70
This past year, the case of Dena Corp. v. Belvedere International, Inc.
7
1
gave the Federal Circuit an opportunity to review and restate the
law relating to disclaimers. The Dena case evolved out of an applica-
tion to register the mark displayed below:
67. Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545-47
(1920). In Beckwith, the Supreme Court held registration should not be denied simply because
a mark has a fanciful design combined with descriptive wording. Id. The Court noted, how-
ever, that an applicant must waive any claim to a right of exclusive use of the descriptive
words in settings other than that covered by the application. Id. Consequently, the Court
permitted the use of a disclaimer. Id.
68. The Principal Register, ch. 540, tit. I, § 6, 60 Stat. 429 (1946) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1056 (1988)). The provision originally stated:
The Commissioner shall require unregistrable matter to be disclaimed, but such dis-
claimer shall not prejudice or affect the applicant's or owner's rights then existing or
thereafter arising in the disclaimed matter, nor shall such disclaimer prejudice or
affect the applicant's or owner's rights of registration on another application of later
date if the disclaimed matter has become distinctive of the applicant's or owner's
goods or services.
Ied
69. S. REP. No. 2107, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2844, 2845. Section 6 now reads as follows:
(a) The Commissioner may require the applicant to disclaim an unregistrable com-
ponent of a mark otherwise registrable. An applicant may voluntarily disclaim a
component of a mark sought to be registered.
(b) No disclaimer, including those made under subsection (e) of section 1057 of
this Title, shall prejudice or affect the applicant's or registrant's rights then existing
or thereafter arising in the disclaimed matter, or his right of registration on another
application if the disclaimed matter be or shall have become distinctive of his goods
or services.
15 U.S.C. § 1056 (1988).
70. Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int'l, Inc., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
71. 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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EUROPEAN FORMULA
72
Prior to publication, the Examiner required applicant Belvedere to
disclaim the words EUROPEAN FORMULA due to their obvious
descriptiveness. 73 Dena subsequently opposed, alleging that the
words EUROPEAN FORMULA were "so highly descriptive" that
they should be deleted from the mark proposed to be registered
rather than merely disclaimed.74 After apparently protracted mo-
tion practice, it became clear that the issue before the Board was
whether the design and word portion of applicant's mark created a
single unitary mark which would not require any disclaimer. 75 The
opposer then renewed its motion for summary judgment, alleging
that applicant's mark was not unitary and moreover that the words
were incapable of functioning as a mark with the design and should
not be registered on the Principal Register. The Board denied op-
poser's motion and granted summary judgment to applicant sua
sponte on the grounds that the words EUROPEAN FORMULA and
the design constituted a single unitary mark. 76 Opposer appealed.
In its analysis on appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed disclaimer
policy history and legislation 77 and then summarized the policy as
72. Dena, 21 U.S.P.Q2d at 1048 (reprinting European Formula mark).
73. Id.
74. Id. Applicant admitted that "the words EUROPEAN FORMULA by themselves are
unable to function as a trademark." Id. The undisputed evidence showed that EUROPEAN
FORMULA was a widely used term in the cosmetic and toiletries industry. Id. at 1049.
75. Id. The Board noted "that if Belvedere's application-the design and words to-
gether-defines a single unitary mark, then any descriptiveness of the disclaimed term EURO-
PEAN FORMULA is irrelevant." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1051.
As to the underlying policy reasons behind permitting disclaimers, the Court stated:
The Lanham Act's disclaimer requirement strikes a statutory balance between two
competing trademark principles. On the one hand, it provides the benefits of the
Lanham Act to applicants for composite marks with unregistrable components. On
the other hand, the Act prevents an applicant from claiming exclusive rights to dis-
claimed portions apart from the composite marks. The applicant's competitors in
the same trade must remain free to use descriptive terms without legal harassment.
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follows:
(1) The Commissioner has the discretion to permit an applicant to
disclaim an unregistrable component of an otherwise registrable
mark.7
8
(2) An applicant may not disclaim all elements of a composite
mark because a mark with no registrable component must be en-
tirely disclaimed and is therefore completely unregistrable. 79
(3) Applicants cannot acquire registration by attaching an insignif-
icant element to an unregistrable mark.80 For example, if an appli-
cant has a mark whose dominant feature is an unregistrable
component which imparts nonregistrable meaning to the entire
mark, that applicant may not obtain registration by disclaimer. 8 1
(4) An entirely separate and removable unregistrable component
of a mark, for instance a generic term, should be removed rather
than disclaimed, because the unregistrable component is not really
considered a part of the mark at all.82
(5) The Commissioner may not require a disclaimer where a mark
is unitary because a "unitary mark simply has no 'unregistrable com-
ponent,' but is instead an inseparable whole .... ,,83
Having reviewed the disclaimer policy, the Federal Circuit faced
the Board's determination that the EUROPEAN FORMULA and de-
sign mark was a "single unitary mark" not requiring a disclaimer or
removal. The court articulated the test for determining the exist-
ence of a unitary mark, stating that the elements of such a mark
must be inseparable.8 4 The mark as a whole must have a distinct
independent meaning from that of its constituent elements; it must
create a "single and distinct commercial impression." The court
further stated that the Board must determine the way in which the
average purchaser, under regular marketing conditions, would en-
counter and react to the mark.8 5
Applying this test, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's deter-
Id.
78. Id. at 1052.
79. Id. at 1051.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1052.
83. Id. at 1051.
84. Id. at 1052.
85. Id. The Board cites TMEP § 807.13(a) (rev. 1986), stating
The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) sets forth several factors to
assist in making this determination: 'whether it is physically connected to the mark
by lines or other design features; how close the matter is located to the mark and
whether side by side on the same line; the meaning of the words and how the mean-
ing relates to each other and to the goods . . .
Id. at 1052.
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mination that applicant's mark constituted a unitary mark.8 6 The
court noted that the disclaimed words, EUROPEAN FORMULA,
were unconnected to the design by any lines or design features and
that the meaning of the words was apparently unconnected to the
design. The proximity of words and design failed to "endow the
whole with a single, integrated, and distinct commercial impres-
sion."8 7 The court vacated the Board's grant of summary judgment
and remanded the opposition for further proceedings to determine,
among other things, whether the words EUROPEAN FORMULA so
dominated the mark that the words and design as a whole were un-
registrable or whether the words EUROPEAN FORMULA so sepa-
rate from the rest of the mark that they should be deleted.88
Because disclaimer policy can be set out in a fairly straightforward
manner, it would seem to follow that application of the policy
should be equally easy. Case history, however, suggests that these
determinations have no more consistency than determinations re-
garding descriptiveness and suggestiveness8 9 or what is primarily a
mere surname.90
II. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. The "Use in Commerce" Requirement
A trademark or service mark may be registered under section 1 (a)
of the Lanham Act if it is "used in commerce." Section 45 of the Act
defines use in commerce as "the bona fide use of a mark in the ordi-
nary course of trade," and "commerce" as "all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress." 9 1
This year, in Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Restaurant
Corp.,92 the Federal Circuit reiterated that an applicant for trade-
mark registration is entitled to an extremely broad reading of the
"use in commerce" requirement. 93 The court affirmed the grant of
summary judgment to applicant, The Williams Restaurant Corpora-
86. Dena, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1052.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1053.
89. See In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1141, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The four classic categories-generic... descriptive
... suggestive, or arbitrary-have been described as 'central tones in a spectrum,' that 'tend
to merge at their edges and are frequently difficult to apply.' ").
90. See, e.g., In re Etablissements Darty et Fils., 759 F.2d 15, 17, 225 U.S.P.Q. 652, 653
(Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The question of whether a word sought to be registered is primarily merely
a surname within the meaning of the statute can be resolved only on a case by case basis.").
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
92. 929 F.2d 662, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1292 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 85 (1991).
93. Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Restaurant Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 666, 18
U.S.P.Q2d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 85 (1991).
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tion, which had applied to register the mark BOZO'S for restaurant
services. Applicant had operated a single pit barbecue restaurant
under the name BOZO'S in Mason, Tennessee since 1932.
94
Opposer, Larry Harmon Pictures Corporation, first unsuccessfully
contended that applicant's use of the mark BOZO'S in connection
with a single-location restaurant not located on or near an interstate
highway did not amount to use in commerce under the Lanham Act,
citing a decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, In re
Bookbinder's.9s The court distinguished on the ground that the appli-
cant in In re Bookbinder's failed to prove any use in commerce, while
here, BOZO'S presented significant evidence of use in commerce.
96
Opposer alternatively proposed a test under which a single-location
restaurant could not register its mark unless it was located on an
interstate highway, served more than fifty percent of its meals to
interstate travelers, or regularly advertised in out-of-state media.
97
The court expressly rejected Harmon's argument that a threshold
level of interstate activity must be established before a single-loca-
tion restaurant may register a mark.98 The court reasoned that
"[t]he Lanham Act by its terms extends to all commerce which Con-
gress may regulate" and that the judiciary has no authority to alter
or limit the "unambiguous language of the statute."9 9 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the Board's decision.
In dissent, Judge Newman asserted that the broad interpretation
of the majority was contrary to the legislative intent of the Lanham
Act. She suggested that the real Lanham Act issue was whether
Congress intended to authorize nationwide registration of local res-
taurant service marks when it used the phrase "services . . .ren-
dered in Commerce" and not whether the Constitution granted
Congress the power to do so. 100 Citing debate from the Senate
hearings prior to the Act's passage, Judge Newman concluded that
Congress did not contemplate nationwide registration of local res-
taurant service marks and that more than "some contact" with inter-
94. Id at 663, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1292.
95. Ia, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1293 (citing In re Bookbinder's, 240 F.2d 365, 112 U.S.P.Q. 326
(C.C.P.A. 1957)).
96. Id. at 664, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1294. The Court described applicant's relationship to
interstate commerce. Specifically, the court noted: (1) the popularity of the restaurant with
residents of Memphis, a major commercial center for the mid-South region; (2) the fact that
BOZO's has been mentioned in out-of-state publications; and (3) the Board's opinion and
opposer's admission that the restaurant served interstate travelers. Id. at 663, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1292-93.
97. Id. at 663-64, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1293.
98. Id. at 666, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1295.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 668, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1297 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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state commerce was required for registration.' 0 '
The majority decision should nonetheless hardly seem surprising.
The Lanham Act incorporates by reference a substantial body ofju-
risprudence interpreting the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 0 2 by which Congress is empowered "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... ,'10 In fact,
the Supreme Court had already expansively interpreted the Com-
merce Clause by the time Congress passed the Lanham Act.
10 4
The Federal Circuit's decision in Harmon Pictures is significant in
that it is apparently only the second decision in which the Federal
Circuit, or its predecessor, has considered the registrability of a
101. Id. at 669, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1298 (Newman,J., dissenting) (citing Hearings on H.R. 82
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1944)). The majority
was unpersuaded by such extrinsic evidence of congressional intent, given the clear and un-
ambiguous definition of federal trademark jurisdiction contained in the statute. Harmon Pic-
tures, 929 F.2d at 665-66, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1295.
102. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
103. Id.; see Platt, Is a Trademark Owner's Right To Use the Mark Protected by the First Amend-
ment?, 11 HorsiAt L. REV. 1261, 1263 (1983) (noting centrality of Commerce Clause in Lan-
ham Actjurisprudence). It is, of course, this clause which empowers Congress to regulate the
law of trademarks. The first American trademark statute, enacted in 1870, was struck down by
the Supreme Court in 1879 because Congress erroneously based the statute on its power to
regulate patents and copyrights under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 96-97 (1879).
104. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (holding that Congress could
constitutionally regulate production by farmer in Ohio who grew wheat on mere 23 acres and
saved most of crop for home consumption). Later Commerce Clause cases involved fact pat-
terns more closely to that present in Harmon Pictures. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (holding that Congress could prohibit racial discrimination by single-
location barbecue restaurant with tenuous impact on interstate commerce).
This body ofjurisprudence was applied in trademark cases as well. In 1952, the Supreme
Court, in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., held that the "broad jurisdictional grant of the Lanham
Act" applied to an American citizen residing in San Antonio, Texas who manufactured coun-
terfeit Bulova watches in Mexico using American-made components, some of which were
purchased by American nationals visiting Mexico. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U'S. 280,
286 (1952). The federal courts virtually eliminated the "intrastate infringement defense" in
trademark cases by the early 1960s. See Trail Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 381
F.2d 353, 354, 155 U.S.P.Q. 51, 52 (5th Cir. 1967) (upholding finding of trademark violation
despite infringer's business being local in character); Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 94, 139 U.S.P.Q. 465, 470 (9th Cir. 1963) (questioning continuing validity
of intrastate infringement defense in trademark cases), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964); Lyon
v. Quality Courts United, Inc., 249 F.2d 790, 795, 115 U.S.P.Q. 300, 303 (6th Cir. 1957)
(concluding that Lanham Act does not require that infringing use involve interstate com-
merce).
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals followed the trend in In re Castown, Inc., where
the court reversed the Board's denial of federal registration to an operator of a chain of auto-
mobile and truck service stations, all located in the State of Ohio. In re Gastown, Inc., 326
F.2d 780, 781, 140 U.S.P.Q. 216, 216 (C.C.P.A. 1964). The court noted that some of the
stations were located on federal highways and that various customers had lived in other states
and concluded, based on these circumstances, that appellant's services directly affected inter-
state commerce. Id. at 784, 140 U.S.P.Q. at 218. This holding was reaffirmed by the same
court in In re Application of Silenus Wines, Inc., a 1977 case involving intrastate sale of wines
imported from France. In re Application of Silenus Wines, Inc., 557 F.2d 806, 194 U.S.P.Q
261 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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mark used by a single-location restaurant. 10 5 Moreover, whatever
the policy merits may be of excluding some local trademark usages
from the nationwide registration system, the Harmon Pictures deci-
sion casts doubt on the continuing validity of decisions in which the
Board denied registration to service marks used by local service es-
tablishments based on their lack of impact on interstate com-
merce, 106 and leaves open whether there is any service mark use
which would be considered purely "intrastate" for purposes of the
Lanham Act. '
0 7
B. Establishment of Rights from Prior Public Use of a Mark
In National Cable Television Association v. American Cinema Editors,108
Chief Judge Nies confirmed that proof of prior use analogous to
trade name or service mark use is sufficient grounds for cancellation
of a registered mark. 10 9 In this cancellation proceeding, the regis-
trant was the National Cable Television Association, Inc. (NCTA), a
trade association for the cable industry. Since 1979, NCTA had
been presenting the ACE award for excellence in cable broadcast-
ing. NCTA registered ACE as a service mark for "awards presenta-
tions" in 1984. The petitioner, American Cinema Editors, was
formed to advance the art and science of film editing and had used
its mark A.C.E. since the early 1950s as a collective mark to indicate
membership. The petitioner had been presenting awards for out-
standing achievement in film and television editing long before the
NCTA's first awards in 1979. These awards went by varying official
names, but the press and others had long called them "ACE
AWARDS." In 1979, and from time to time thereafter, petitioner
objected to NCTA's use of ACE. NCTA responded that it would try
to minimize any confusion by using its organizational name with
105. Harmon Pictures, 929 F.2d at 667, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1296 (Newman, J., dissenting).
106. See In re Conti, 220 U.S.P.Q. 745, 749 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (denying registration to sin-
gle-location barber shop/beauty salon); In re U.S. Home Corp. of Tex., 199 U.S.P.Q. 698, 702
(T.T.A.B. 1978) (denying registration to establishment engaged in "planning and laying out
residential communities for others, and the sale of real estate and homesites relating
thereto").
107. Harmon Pictures, 929 F.2d at 666, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1295. Implicitly rejected is the
Board's dictum, in In re U.S. Home Corp. of Tex., 199 U.S.P.Q. 698 (T.T.A.B. 1978), that
Congress intended a broader reach in enacting "social and reform legislation" such as the
Fair Housing Act or the Civil Rights Act than it intended in enacting the Lanham Act, which
"was enacted purely for economic purposes." Id. at 701-02.
108. 937 F.2d 1572, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
109. National Cable Television Ass'n v. American Cinema Editors, 937 F.2d 1572, 1578
n.4, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1424, 1429 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
The court also specifically reaffirmed the court's prior position that with regard to opposi-
tion and cancellation proceedings laches runs from the date that a party was deemed to have
knowledge of the application to register, i.e. the date of publication for opposition in the
Official Gazette. Id. at 1580-82, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1424, 1431.
96919921
970 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:951
ACE "whenever possible." American Cinema Editors subsequently
filed a petition to cancel NCTA's 1984 registration of ACE. ' 0
Following motions for summary judgment by both parties, the
Board granted the petition to cancel."' On appeal there was no
dispute that petitioner had long used A.C.E. as a collective mark,
but registrant argued that petitioner had made no trade name or
service mark use of ACE sufficient to support the Board's finding of
likelihood of confusion. The court rejected this argument, noting
that while petitioner failed to ever print ACE on its letterhead or
officially adopt the acronym as a trade name in its bylaws, there were
voluminous examples of use by petitioner of the acronym as a trade
name for the organization within its publications and correspon-
dence. "12 Moreover, the record showed that third parties routinely
shortened "American Cinema Editors" to ACE.
The court also rejected registrant's argument that the literal lan-
guage of the Lanham Act prohibited consideration of the public's
use of ACE with reference to petitioner in determining whether pe-
titioner had established trade name rights.' ' 3 Section 45(a) of the
Lanham Act defines a trade name as "any use by a person to identify
his or her business or vocation," and section 2(d) of the Lanham Act
speaks of"a... trade name previously used ... by another.... ,,1,4
The Federal Circuit affirmed a line of Board precedent holding that
use of an abbreviation or acronym by the public is alone sufficient to
support a finding of trade name rights." 5
110. Id at 1574-75, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426-27. There was apparently a good deal of ac-
tual confusion caused by the parties' use of "ACE." In fact, a member of American Cinema
Editors received an ACE AWARD from NCTA in 1985 for cable film editing and several of
American Cinema Editors' members were among the NCTAjudges. Id. at 1575, 19 U.S.P.Q
at 1426.
111. Id. at 1575, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1427.
112. Id. at 1577, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1428.
113. Id
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1127(a) (1988).
115. National Cable Television, 937 F.2d at 1577-78, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1428. In affirming
Board precedent, the court stated:
[E]ven without use directly by the claimant of the rights, the courts and the Board
generally have recognized that abbreviations and nicknames of trademarks or names
used only by the public give rise to protectable rights in the owners of the trade
name or mark which the public modified. Such public use by others inures to the
claimant's benefit and, where this occurs, public use can reasonably be deemed use
"by" that party in the sense of a use on its behalf.
Id. The court relied on various authorities to support its reasoning, including American Stock
Exch., Inc. v. American Express Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. 356, 363 (T.T.A.B. 1980) (protecting
AMEX mark); Norac Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 306, 315 (T.T.A.B.
1977) (determining earlier use of OXY by public to hold priority); Volkswagen A.G. v.
Thermo-Chem Corp., 185 U.S.P.Q. 560, 562 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (protecting BUG as nickname
for automobile); Pieper v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 318, 320 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (pro-
tecting BUNNY CLUB); Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 409, 52 U.S.P.Q. 377, 383
(D.C. Pa. 1942) (protecting COKE mark and noting that frequent public use of mark's short
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Likewise, the court rejected registrant's contention that petitioner
could not prevail because it had not used ACE as a service mark for
awards ceremonies in such a way as to be entitled to register the
mark." l 6 Finally, in what may well become known as the "canned
pea doctrine," the court rejected registrant's argument that the
plethora of third-party uses of ACE made confusion unlikely. The
court reasoned that third-party uses were irrelevant because the two
contesting parties had nearly identical uses which were entirely dis-
tinct from all others.
1 7
C. Registrability of Geographical Terms
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a mark
which "[c]onsists [of] or comprises ...deceptive matter. .. . 1
Marks which deceive the public as to the geographic origin of goods
or services have long been held to be unregistrable under this provi-
sion.' 19 In The Scotch Whisky Association v. United States Distilled Prod-
form creates rights); I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:4, at
187-88 (2d ed. 1984) (suggesting that if public has shortened trademark into nickname, nick-
name is entitled to independent legal protection as mark). Id. at n.3.
116. National Cable Television, 937 F.2d at 1578, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1429 (citing Jim Dandy
Co. v. Martha White Foods, Inc., 458 F.2d 1397, 1400, 173 U.S.P.Q. 673, 676 (C.C.P.A.
1972)). The court stated:
It is not required that Editors meet the technical statutory requirements to register
ACE as its mark for award ceremonies in order for Editors to have a basis for objec-
tion to another's registration. Prior public identification of petitioner with the name
ACE for awards from use analogous to service mark usage is a sufficient ground for
cancellation.
Id.
117. lId at 1579-80, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1430. Judge Nies stated:
To take an extreme example, ACE for canned, large peas could not escape likelihood
of confusion with a prior use of ACE for canned, small peas because ACE is concur-
rently used by unrelated third parties on aircraft, clothing, computer services, hard-
ware or even bread, bananas, milk and canned carrots. Properly defined, the
relevant public in the example need be defined no broader than purchasers of
canned peas, and the third party ACE marks outside the segment become essentially
irrelevant.
ILd. at 1579, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1430.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1991).
119. See In re Richemond, 131 U.S.P.Q. 441,444 (T.T.A.B. 1961) (denying registration of
MAID IN PARIS for perfumes not made in Paris). Section 2(a) is essentially an extension of
the common law of false advertising which has long prohibited the use of geographic designa-
tions which deceive the public as to the origin of goods. See Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills
Co. v. Eagle, 86 F. 608, 616 (7th Cir. 1898) (enjoining use of BEST MINNESOTA PATENT,
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. in connection with flour milled in Milwaukee), cert. denied, 112 F. 371
(C.C.N.Y. 1901); Gage-Downs Co. v. Featherbone Corset Co., 83 F. 213, 216 (C.C.W.D.
Mich. 1897) (prohibiting use of mark CHICAGO WAISTS in connection with corsets made in
California and Michigan). The fact that nondeceptive geographic names can be registered
under the Lanham Act represented a significant liberalization over the 1905 Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. § 85(b) (1905), which prohibited registration of marks which were "merely a geo-
graphical name or term." SeeJ. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 14:9, at 646 n.20 (2d ed. 1984).
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ucts,120 the Federal Circuit considered whether a term that was not a
geographic designation in and of itself could nonetheless be geo-
graphically deceptive under section 2(a).
12 1
The Scotch Whisky Association, an association representing dis-
tillers and merchants in Scotland, petitioned to cancel the registra-
tion for the mark McADAMS for whiskey. It alleged that the use of
the Scottish surname McADAMS, in connection with registrant's
Canadian blended whiskey, deceptively connoted Scottish origin
and deceived consumers in violation of section 2(a). On registrant's
motion, the Board dismissed Scotch Whisky's petition to cancel for
failure to state a claim. 122 The Board took the position that "when
asserting geographic deceptiveness, a plaintiff must plead that the
mark has primary geographic significance."' 123 The Board also
ruled that Scotch Whisky failed to plead, as required, "that the term
McADAMS is primarily recognized as a geographical term in and of
itself."1
24
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. It found valid peti-
tioner's "simple proposition" that section 2(a) would prohibit regis-
tration because of deceptiveness, if the mark McADAMS falsely
suggested that registrant's Canadian whiskey originated in Scot-
land.125 The court further found the Board's opinion "internally in-
consistent" and its holding unsupported by precedent. 126 In
reversing, the court held that (1) petitioner had properly alleged a
geographic association with the term; (2) "if the pleaded facts are
proved, petitioner will be entitled to have the registration cancelled
as deceptive;" and (3) the Board's attempt to impose a more strin-
gent pleading requirement had no support in section 2(a) or else-
where. 127 The Federal Circuit remanded to the Board for further
proceedings.
120. 952 F.2d 1317, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
121. Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. United States Distilled Prods. Co., 952 F.2d 1317, 1318-19,
21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1145, 1146-47 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
122. Id. at 1317-18, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1145-46.
123. Id. at 1319, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1147.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1319-20, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1147.
126. Id. Ironically, the Board's opinion contradicted one of the very cases cited as author-
ity for its holding. The Board cited In re Quady Winery, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 1213, 1215
(T.T.A.B. 1984), for the proposition that a term must be primarily recognized as a geographi-
cal term in and of itself. In Quady, a case arising under section 2(e)(1), the Board denied
registration of ESSENSIA in connection with dessert wine produced in California because the
word "Essensia" properly referred to a rare and little-known type of Tokay wine produced in
Hungary but was not the name of a particular geographic region. In re Quady Winery, Inc.,
221 U.S.P.Q. 1213, 1214 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
127. Scotch 'hiskey, 952 F.2d at 1319, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1147.
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D. Trade Dress and Configuration
Trade dress claims only occasionally come before the Federal Cir-
cuit because to do so they must be pendent to patent claims in order
to come before the court.' 28 In deciding trade dress claims, the
court applies the precedent of the regional circuit from which the
case originated.1 29 In 1991, the court heard two trade dress cases,
one on appeal from the District of Minnesota and the other on ap-
peal from the Central District of California.
In Jurgens v. McKasy, 30 plaintiffs claimed infringement of both
patent and trade dress rights in a wind-inflated hunting decoy.'
31
The Jurgens, as plaintiffs, sued CBK, Ltd., a manufacturer of "wind
decoys," and Timothy McKasy, one of CBK's distributors. A jury
awarded plaintiffs a total of $1,055,950, including patent damages
of $12,600, section 43(a) damages of $243,350, and punitive dam-
ages of $800,000.132 After hearing post-trial motions, the district
court doubled the patent and Lanham Act damages assessed against
defendant McKasy, trebled the Lanham Act damages assessed
against defendant CBK, and struck the punitive damages award as
unwarranted by the evidence.' 33
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, defendants argued that the trial
judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could not find the
asserted trade dress to be nonfunctional if doing so would hinder
competition.' 34 The court ruled that, while this was a correct state-
ment of Eighth Circuit law, failure to omit such an instruction was
not prejudicial error because the overall instructions essentially con-
veyed the message to the jurors.13 5 Defendants also argued that the
trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury which factors, in addi-
tion to visual inspection of the decoys, could be considered in deter-
mining confusion. Because the court found the instructions, taken
as a whole, to be proper, it rejected petitioners' claim.' 36 Finally,
the Court rejected the contention that the district court erred by
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1991) (establishing jurisdiction of Federal Circuit).
129. See Atari, Inc. v.JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1438-40, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1074,
1086-87 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that need for uniformity of law demands that governing law
be that of circuit in which district court is located).
130. 927 F.2d 1552, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 281 (1991).
131. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1556, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1034 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 281 (1991).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1556, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1034-35.
134. Id. at 1563, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1040.
135. Id.
136. Id. "Here, the jury instructions as a whole correctly stated Eighth Circuit law be-
cause elsewhere the judge stated that '[l]ikelihood of confusion is also determined by evaluat-
ing the following [Squirt Co.] factors .... " " Id.
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failing to instruct the jury that likelihood of confusion must result
from nonfunctional features.1 37 Again the court noted that the in-
structions as a whole conveyed the message to the jury.
The court agreed with defendants, however, that the trebling of
Lanham Act damages constituted a penalty and therefore violated
both the literal language of section 35(a) and the decisional law of
the Eighth Circuit. 38 The court rejected plaintiff's argument,
based on Seventh Circuit precedent, that trebling was appropriate
in order to penalize willful infringement.' 3 9 The court further re-
jected as disingenuous plaintiff's argument that the judge awarded
treble damages as compensation. In doing so, the Federal Circuit
cited several points in the record where the district court equated its
motivation for the trebling of damages with the jury's motivation for
awarding $800,000 in punitive damages.14
0
The second trade dress case heard by the Federal Circuit in 1991,
Oakley Inc. v. International Tropic-Cal Inc.,' 4 1 arrived at the Federal
Circuit on appeal from the Central District of California. The plain-
tiff claimed that defendant's sunglasses infringed its design patent
and its trade dress rights under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court's grant of a prelimi-
nary injunction. 142
Applying Ninth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit held that the like-
lihood of confusion issue is a question of law based on foundational
facts. While the appellate court may only reverse the trial judge's
findings of foundational facts if they are clearly erroneous, it may
review the conclusions of law which flow from those foundational
facts de novo. 143 In Oakley, the district court failed to make specific
findings as to foundational facts, so that its conclusion as to likely
confusion was "essentially unreviewable." 44 As such, the court re-
manded for specific factual determinations. 145
E. Genericness
In Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB Inc.,146 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1564, 18 U.S.P.Q2d at 1040-41.
139. Id. (citing Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435-36,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1762, 1764 (7th Cir. 1989)).
140. Id.
141. 923 F.2d 167, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
142. Oakley Inc. v. International Tropic-Cal Inc., 923 F.2d 167, 168, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401,
1402 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
143. Id. at 169-70, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1403-04.
144. Id. at 170, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1404.
145. Id.
146. 940 F.2d 638, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Board's denial of a petition to cancel which alleged that the mark
TOUCHLESS for "automobile washing services" 147 was a generic
term.148 This case presented an interesting discussion of the Trade-
mark Clarification Act of 1984149 and a reminder that what is con-
sidered generic within one universe for a specific product or service
may not be deemed generic within another universe for different
products or services. 150
The court maintained that the Trademark Clarification Act of
1984 is a codification of the genericness test articulated by Judge
Learned Hand in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. 151 In Bayer, Judge
Hand posed the critical inquiry, "What do the buyers understand by
the word for whose use the parties are contending?"' 5 2 Thus, the
court acknowledged that the 1984 amendment makes the under-
standing by the "relevant public" central to the genericness inquiry.
The court in Magic Wand interpreted the Clarification Act's term
"relevant public" as referring to the public "which does or may
purchase the goods or services in the marketplace."'' 5 3
This analysis of the Clarification Act led the court to affirm the
Board's conclusion that the relevant purchasing public for "automo-
bile washing services" was automobile owners and operators, not
147. The service at issue featured cleaning by the use of high-pressure water. The car is
never touched by brushes or cloths. Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 639, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
148. Id. Trademark registrations, including incontestable registrations, are subject to
cancellation if it is proven that the subject mark has become generic. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3)
(1984). In determining whether a mark is generic, the Board must focus on the statement of
goods or services found in the registration certificate. Magic Wand, 940 F.2d 640, 19
U.S.P.Q 2d at 1552.
149. Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 102, 98 Stat. 3335
(1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1984)). The Act added the following language: "The
primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser moti-
vation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic
name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1064(3) (1984). Magic Wand is one of only a few Federal Circuit genericness cases which
have mentioned the Trademark Clarification Act. For other cases addressing the Act, see In re
Montrachet, S.A., 878 F.2d 375, 377, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1393, 1395 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that
Act permits identification of product name coined by its purveyor); H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v.
International Ass'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989, 228 U.S.P.Q. 528, 530 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (relating Act to issue of whether relevant public used or understood term sought to be
protected).
150. See, e.g., In re Seats, Inc., 757 F.2d 274, 277, 225 U.S.P.Q. 364, 367 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("The term 'seats' may be generic in relation to chairs or couches or bleachers. It is clearly
not generic to reservation services."); MasterCard Int'l v. American Express Co., 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1551, 1554 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (holding GOLD CARD generic for charge card serv-
ices but not for hotel/motel reservation services); In re Minnetonka Inc., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711,
1713 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (holding SOFT SOAP generic for industrial soap but not for liquid
hand soap).
151. Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 640, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1551, 1553 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (citing Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)).
152. Id. at 640, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1552 (quoting Bayer, 272 F. at 509).
153. Id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1552-53.
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the operators and manufacturers of car washing equipment. 154 Un-
fortunately, petitioner presented no evidence to show generic use or
understanding by those who purchase car washing services. 155
Therefore, the fact that petitioner's evidence disclosed that those in
the trade, namely car wash manufacturers and operators, use the
term "touchless" generically was irrelevant and created a failure of
proof.156
F. Likelihood of Confusion
1. The 'family of marks" argument
The Federal Circuit, in J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's
Corp. ,' 5 7 reaffirmed the viability of the "family of marks" argument.
Although the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals first accepted
the family of marks argument in 1963 in Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Elec-
tronics, Inc., 5 8 the argument has infrequently proven to be successful
or decisive.15 9 InJ &J Snack Foods, however, the court affirmed the
decision of the Board that McDUGAL McPRETZEL and Mc-
PRETZEL, when applied to soft pretzels sold in bulk to food service
retailers and schools, was likely to be confused with McDonald's
family of "Mc" marks which included, among others, McDONUT,
McPIZZA, McMUFFIN, McCHICKEN, and McRIB. In so affirming,
154. Id. at 641, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1553-54.
155. Id. Evidence of purchaser understanding may come from direct testimony of con-
sumers, consumer surveys, dictionary listings, as well as newspapers and other publications.
See In re Northland Aluminum Prods., Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 1559, 227 U.S.P.Q. 961, 963 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
156. Findings as to genericness are based on facts and the Board's decision must be ac-
cepted unless found to be clearly erroneous. The petitioner had the burden to show by pre-
ponderance of the evidence that TOUCHLESS was generic to the relevant public. Magic
Wand, 940 F.2d at 641-42, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1552.
157. 932 F.2d 1460, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
158. 317 F.2d 397, 137 U.S.P.Q. 551 (C.C.P.A. 1963). The Federal Circuit accepted the
"family of marks" argument in 1984. See International Diagnostic Technology, Inc. v. Miles
Lab., Inc., 746 F.2d 798, 800, 223 U.S.P.Q. 977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (upholding Board's
finding that confusion was likely between STIQ for "immuno-assay equipment for medical
laboratories," and Miles' family of STIX marks used in connection with in vitro diagnostic
tests).
159. See I J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:20, at 105-
06 (2d ed. 1984) (noting that plaintiffs are rarely successful in making family of marks argu-
ment). Outside of the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court, there is surprisingly little
appellate discussion of the family of marks argument. In addition to the Federal Circuit, only
the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have explicitly passed on the family of marks
argument. See Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1785, 1789 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing defendants' FORT family of marks); Aloe Creme Lab.,
Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 847, 165 U.S.P.Q. 37, 39 (5th Cir.) (holding plaintiff had no
rights in ALO family of marks), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe
Creme Lab., 420 F.2d 1248, 1250-51, 164 U.S.P.Q. 266, 269 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
820 (1970) (holding defendant had no rights in ALO family of marks); Creamette Co. v. Mer-
lino, 299 F.2d 55, 59, 132 U.S.P.Q. 381, 383 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding plaintiff had no rights to
"ettes" family of marks).
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the court noted the central role of the public's recognition of the
"recognizable common characteristic" of the family, and not merely
its recognition of the individual member marks, in establishing the
existence of a family of marks. 60
Applicant could not realistically challenge the fame of opposer's
"Mc" marks.' 61 It argued, however, that the trademark owner must
prove independent trademark rights in the common element, or
"formative," apart from the marks containing that formative, in or-
der to establish rights in the family. The court rejected this
argument.
62
Applicant also noted the existence of many third-party registra-
tions of "Mc" marks and the registration by McCormick & Company
of "Mc," standing alone, for spices. The court stated that although
third parties are permitted to register various "Mc" names, such re-
gistrations do not defeat McDonald's own specific family of marks in
which the prefix "Mc" accompanies generic food names to create
"fanciful words."' 63 Applicant also argued that registration should
have been granted because of its lack of intent to trade on McDon-
ald's goodwill. The court held that, while evidence of intent to
160. J &J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1889, 1891 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The court set out the standard for establishing the existence of a
family of marks, stating:
A family of marks is a group of marks having a recognizable common characteris-
tic, wherein the marks are composed and used in such a way that the public associ-
ates not only the individual marks, but the common characteristic of the family, with
the trademark owner. Simply using a series of marks does not of itself establish the
existence of a family. There must be a recognition among the purchasing public that
the common characteristic is indicative of a common origin of the goods.... Recog-
nition of the family is achieved when the pattern of usage of the common element is
sufficient to be indicative of the origin of the family.
Id.
161. Id. at 1463, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1892. The court noted that in 1987, McDonald's oper-
ated 7600 outlets in the United States with sales of over $14 billion and an advertising budget
of $405 million. Id
The "family of marks" argument has become a stock weapon in McDonald's legal arsenal.
In a previous case, McDonald's successfully argued that the use of McBAGEL'S in connection
with a bagel bakery infringed and diluted the family of "Mc" marks. McDonald's Corp. v.
McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1270, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1761, 1763 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In an-
other case, McDonald's successfully enjoined Quality Inn's proposed use of McSLEEP INNS
in connection with hotel services. Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp.
198, 221, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633, 1653 (D. Md. 1988). In that case, the court rejected Quality
Inn's claim that the "Mc" formative had become a generic prefix signifying "thrifty, consistent
and perhaps convenient" goods or services. IdL at 214, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465. The court
noted that "[a] family of marks may have a synergistic recognition that is greater than the sum
of each mark." IA at 212, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1643. Finally, in the most recent case, the Board
denied registration of McTEDDY for teddy bears, citing likely confusion with the "Mc" family
of marks. McDonald's Corp. v. McKinley, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1895, 1904-05 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
162. J &J Snack Foods, 932 F.2d at 1463, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1892.
163. l With regard to third party use, the court appears to be applying the "canned pea
doctrine" announced in National Cable Television Ass'n v. American Cinema Editors, 937
F.2d 1572, 1579, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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trade on the goodwill of another should be considered, the absence
of such evidence does not avoid a likelihood of confusion ruling.' 6
Finally, the court held that the fact that applicant sold its pretzels
at the wholesale level did not preclude a finding of likely confusion.
The court stated that registrability hinges on the description of
goods in the application and also noted that goods bearing the dis-
puted marks would reach the consuming public. 165 The court also
seems to have been heavily influenced in this regard by a McDon-
ald's survey in which thirty percent of those questioned said that
they thought a product marked McPRETZEL was a McDonald's
product. 166
2. Other likelihood of confusion decisions
The Federal Circuit issued several likelihood of confusion opin-
ions this year which deserve brief mention.
In National Data Corp. v. Computer Systems Engineering, Inc. ,167 an un-
published decision, the court upheld as "not clearly erroneous" the
Board's determination that applicant's mark, NATIONAL
DATACOMPUTER and design, when applied to portable data col-
lection computer terminals, was unlikely to be confused with op-
poser's mark, NATIONAL DATA CORPORATION, used for
electronic data processing services.1 68
Opposer's services involved such things as credit card verification,
corporate financial services relating to reports of bank deposits, and
the operation of computer terminals and voice centers for
telemarketing services. On the other hand, applicant sold hand-
held data collectors used primarily by retail stores such as supermar-
kets for taking inventories and communicating orders to home office
data processing systems. The court noted the Board's findings that
opposer sold services, not goods, and that the business information
collected by opposer was not of the same type collected by appli-
cant's portable terminals" The Board also relied on the fact that the
purchasers of the goods and services at issue were highly sophisti-
164. J &J Snack Foods, 932 F.2d at 1462, 18 U.S.P.Q2d at 1891.
165. Id. at 1463, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1892.
166. Id. at 1463-64, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1892.
In response to applicant's contention that the survey was flawed in content and execution,
the court appears to reaffirm the holding, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Essential Prods. Co., 421 F.2d
1374, 1376, 164 U.S.P.Q. 628, 630 (C.C.P.A. 1970), that such flaws go to the weight accorded
to the survey and not its admissibility.
167. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15261 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 1991) (unpublished opinion).
168. National Data Corp. v. Computer Sys. Eng'g, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15261, at *6
(Fed. Cir.July 10, 1991) (unpublished opinion). Pursuant to FED. CIR. R. 47.8, decisions and
orders designated by the court as unpublished are not citable as precedent.
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cated and the parties used different media, trade shows, and
markets. 6
9
The only interesting aspect of this case was the way the Board and
court dealt with the issue of actual confusion. With regard to actual
confusion, the opposer offered only one instance involving an indi-
vidual, indirectly related to opposer, who on seeing the applicant's
advertisement in a computer magazine thought that it referred to
opposer's business activity.1 70 Quite correctly, the Board and court
rejected this isolated instance as irrelevant speculation and con-
firmed the view of many practitioners that when there is only one
instance of actual confusion, it is better not offered into evidence,
even if it is unequivocal.
1 71
In an unpublished decision, In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Company,'
72
the Federal Circuit reiterated its position that "likelihood of confu-
sion is a question of law to be decided by the [c]ourt based on the
facts of the case" and overruled the Board's refusal to allow regis-
tration of the mark THE INDY TUBE for "rubber inner tubes."'
173
The Board based its denial of the application on the mark INDY 500
for "tread rubber for automobile tires," previously registered by the
Indianapolis Motor Speedway Corporation. 174 On appeal, applicant
did not challenge the holding that the goods were related, but
claimed INDY was generic for "a race car or race circuit." The
court agreed, holding that the evidence did not support the conclu-
sion that the term "INDY," as opposed to "INDY 500," was suscep-
tible to exclusive appropriation. 175 The court also noted the basic
principle that "marks are to be compared on their entireties" and
concluded that the marks THE INDY TUBE and INDY 500 were not
confusingly similar as applied to their respective goods. 176
169. Id at *3.
170. Id at *5.
171. Jl
172. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18040 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 1991) (unpublished opinion).
173. In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18040 at *3 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
1, 1991) (unpublished opinion).
174. Id The Board concluded that the marks had "the same suggestive connotation...
namely the product is of such quality as automotive products used in the INDY 500 race." Id
175. Idl
176. Id at *3; see, e.g.,Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Houston Ice & Brewing Co., 250 U.S.
28, 29 (1919) (Holmes,J.) ("It is a fallacy to break the faggot stick by stick" because confusion
can only be determined by comparing marks in their entireties); Mr. Hero Sandwich Sys., Inc.
v. Roman Meal Co., 781 F.2d 884, 887, 228 U.S.P.Q. 364, 366 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that
marks must be compared in their entireties to determine confusion); In re National Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 U.S.P.Q. 749, 750-51 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that public's
knowledge of both marks using CASH MANAGEMENT must be viewed in their entireties).
The Federal Circuit, in National Data Corp., stated with respect to the likelihood of confusion
issue that it is not improper for "more or less weight [to be] given to a particular feature of a
mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entire-
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In Kellogg Co. v. Pack'Em Enterprises, Inc.,'"7 the court affirmed the
Board's grant of summary judgment for applicant on the grounds
that FROOTEE ICE, when applied to packages of flavored liquid
frozen into bars, was unlikely to be confused with FROOT LOOPS
for a variety of goods, including breakfast cereal, snacks, and frozen
confections. 178 The Board considered the applicable likelihood of
confusion factors, 179 and determined that the first factor, "the simi-
larity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appear-
ance, sound, connotation and commercial impression," was
dispositive.' 80
Simply put, the Board found the marks so dissimilar that even
weighing all other applicable factors in favor of the opposer, there
was no possible likelihood of confusion. On appeal, the court
agreed that there was no reason why a single DuPont factor should
not outweigh all the rest.1 81 Moreover, the court found that, con-
ties." Id. at 1058, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 751; accord Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc.,
710 F.2d 1565, 1570, 218 U.S.P.Q. 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (suggesting courts give greater
force and effect to dominant feature of marks as part of comparison of marks' entireties).
177. 951 F.2d 330, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
178. Kellogg Co. v. Pack'Em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 331, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1142, 1143
(Fed. Cir. 1991). Applicant's mark consisted of the disclaimed words FROOTEE ICE in styl-
ized script and an elephant design. Opposer's mark FROOT LOOPS appears in plain block
letters. Id. at 331, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1143.
179. Id The likelihood of confusion factors under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act are set
out in In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567
(C.C.P.A. 1973):
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described
in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., "impulse"
vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been concur-
rent use without evidence of actual confusion.
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, "family"
mark, product mark).
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark: (a) a
mere "consent" to register or use. (b) agreement provisions designed to preclude
confusion, i.e., limitations on continued use of the marks by each party. (c) assign-
ment of mark, application, registration and good will of the related business. (d)
laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of lack of
confusion.
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its
mark on its goods.
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial.
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
Id.
180. Kellogg, 951 F.2d at 332, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1144.
181. Id. at 333, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1145.
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trary to Kellogg's assertion, the Board properly considered all the
evidence, but simply found that the first factor outweighed the rest.
The court also noted that, while factors such as the relatedness of
the goods, the channels of trade, and the fame of its mark weighed
in Kellogg's favor, Kellogg failed to address the dissimilarity of the
marks. 182 Specifically, the court noted that "Kellogg presented no
facts showing actual confusion, such as a customer survey."1 83 This
latter point may reinforce the developing assumption among trade-
mark practitioners that, even before the Board, a party plaintiff takes
a chance if it does not submit a survey.
Finally, in the unpublished decision of Guaber, S.p.A. v. Nutri-Metics
Int'l, Inc. ,184 the court affirmed the Board's determination that appli-
cant's mark NEUTROMED and design was likely to be confused
with opposer's mark NUTRI-METICS.1 85 This case presents a
slight variation on the prior noted basic rule that marks are not to be
dissected, but should instead be considered in their entireties. In
other words, circumstances may be such that one feature so domi-
nates a mark that it alone creates the essential commercial impres-
sion. In this case, the word NEUTROMED so dominated
applicant's mark that the other features, including the design and
disclaimed descriptive language, "pH 5.5," did not weigh against a
holding of confusing similarity.186
CONCLUSION
With regard to trademark law, the Federal Circuit did not issue
any particularly startling decisions in 1991. Basically, it provided
clarification in some areas and in other areas, reinforced existing
bodies of precedent. However, three cases taken as a group (Mother
Tucker's, Hewlett-Packard and Copelands) may signal that the Federal
Circuit and ultimately the PTO will enforce rules more stringently




184. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10842 (Fed. Cir. May 17, 1991) (unpublished opinion).
185. Guaber, S.p.A. v. Nutri-Metics Int'l, Inc., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10842, at *I (Fed.
Cir. May 17, 1991) (unpublished opinion). The disputed marks were used in connection with
"substantially identical" goods. Id. at *2.
186. Id. at *4. The court also affirmed the Board's rejection ofapplicant's third-party use
defense. Id. at *4-5. The court agreed with the Board that even if the NUTRO-prefix was
considered weak, a likelihood of confusion could still be found if, "in their entireties, the
marks are so alike as to be confusingly similar." Id.
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